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THE PARTISAN DIMENSIONS OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
Bradley W. Joondeph*
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial decisions resolving disputes over the federal preemption of state law
raise some interesting questions about the significance of partisan affiliations in the
federal courts. First, many people do not consider preemption a particularly
ideological issue, at least in comparison to many others addressed by the federal
judiciary.' Thus, it is not obvious that the voting patterns of federal judges
appointed by Republican and Democratic presidents should differ measurably in
this domain.2 Second, even if preemption questions do, in fact, strike some
ideological chords, there are crosscurrents within the Republican and Democratic
Parties that render the directionality of that impact uncertain. Republicans might
gravitate towards the preemption of state law-and Democrats might shy away
from it-because its immediate consequence is typically to reduce the level of
regulation imposed on private businesses (and to negate state law remedies
available to those alleging injuries caused by those businesses). At the same time,
many Republicans might oppose preemption-and many Democrats might favor
it-for broader, structural reasons: the federal preemption of state law tends to
reduce the policy autonomy of state governments, centralize power in the national
government, and impose a greater level of national uniformity (and perhaps,
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1 For example, a widely publicized recent study of the influence of political ideology
on federal courts of appeals judges' voting patterns examined twenty-four distinct
categories of cases. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 17-18 (2006). The authors, however, did not
examine cases involving federal preemption, at least as a distinct category. See id.
2 The Sunstein et al. study, for instance, found no statistically significant difference in
the voting patterns of Republican and Democrat court of appeals judges in cases dealing
with five categories of issues that would seem more politically salient than federal
preemption: criminal appeals, the Commerce Clause, the Takings Clause, challenges to
punitive damage awards, and standing. See id. at 48-54.
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depending on your view, rationality) in legal standards. In short, if there is a
partisan valence of federal preemption, it is not readily apparent.3
This Article explores some of the empirical uncertainties surrounding the
political dimensions of preemption in the federal courts. More concretely, it
presents a statistical study of the preemption decisions of the United States Courts
of Appeals from 2005 to 2009. I chose the circuit courts (rather than the Supreme
Court of the United States) for two principal reasons. First, the courts of appeals
collectively decide thousands of cases each year, permitting the compilation of a
much larger data set, which in turn facilitates more robust statistical conclusions.
Second, the cases decided by the Supreme Court are, as a group, much more
controversial and politically charged than those in the federal system as a whole.4
Thus, drawing general inferences about judicial behavior from the voting patterns
of Supreme Court justices can be highly problematic.
To conduct my study, then, I created a unique data set that includes every
preemption decision rendered by the United States Courts of Appeals from January
1, 2005, to December 31, 2009, a total of 560 decisions and just over 1,700 judicial
votes. And these data tell a story consisting of two distinct parts. The first part is
that preemption disputes seem to produce a large measure of judicial consensus. In
the full universe of cases, there is only a slight difference between Republican and
Democratic appointees: Republican judges voted for outcomes favoring the
preemption of state law at a rate exceeding Democratic judges by a margin of
roughly 2.6% overall, and roughly 5% in published decisions. While these
differences may not be trivial, they are not statistically significant. Moreover, this
overall similarity was not the product of Republicans and Democrats disagreeing
in different clusters of cases, such that their aggregate voting records masked fairly
frequent clashes. Rather, more than 94% of the circuit courts' published
preemption decisions (and more than 95% of all preemption decisions) were
3 Cf Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DuKE L.J. 75, 133-62 (2001) (discussing the historical reasons that
federalism, as a constitutional principle, should have no particular political valence).
4 See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 265 (2006)
("Almost by definition the cases the [Supreme] Court takes should be novel enough that
precedent ... will not decide the case.").
5 See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to
judges appointed by Republican presidents as "Republican judges" or "Republicans," and
judges appointed by Democratic presidents as "Democratic judges" or "Democrats." Of
course, some judges are cross-party appointments, though this has become increasingly
uncommon for federal circuit court judgeships.
6 To determine statistical significance, I used a two-tailed, difference of proportions
Z-test, which is described infra note 70. The finding that the difference in voting records
between Republicans and Democrats was not statistically significant (at a 95% level of
confidence) means that there is a greater than 5% chance that we would obtain the
observed difference between Republicans and Democrats even if the null hypothesis-that
there is no difference between how Republican and Democratic judges vote on the issue of
preemption-is true. This does not mean, however, that there is a greater than 5% chance
that the null hypothesis is true.
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unanimous-a rate that exceeds our best estimates of the mean for court of appeals
decisions as a whole.7 Preemption therefore differs from many other legal issues
(such as abortion, the death penalty, environmental regulation, gender
discrimination, and disability discrimination, to name a few) where recent
investigations have found significant partisan disparities in the voting records of
federal circuit judges.
The second part of the story is that, despite this general consensus, there
remains an important difference between Republican and Democratic appointees.
Specifically, in the most contested preemption cases-those in which at least one
Republican and one Democrat served on the panel, and at least one judge
dissented-Republican appointees were more than three times as likely as
Democratic appointees to vote in favor of preemption (roughly 73% versus 21%).
Thus, the complete picture of preemption decisions in the courts of appeals is
intriguing, if somewhat unsurprising. As a general matter, preemption cases do not
provoke much fissure among federal circuit judges; the vast majority of cases are
decided unanimously, such that a judge's party affiliation lacks much value in
predicting how she will vote in the randomly selected case. But in particular
circumstances-especially the small subset of preemption cases where judges
disagree on the result-party affiliation appears to be highly predictive of how that
disagreement will play out. In these marginal cases-where the accepted sources
of legal authority fail to control the outcome, and the norms of consensus and
collegiality among circuit judges are insufficient to restrain dissent-the pattern is
unmistakable: Republicans are far more likely than Democrats to favor the federal
preemption of state law.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, Part II lays some groundwork, offering
a general background on the federal preemption of state law. Next, Part III presents
my study of federal circuit court preemption decisions, explaining the study's
design and summarizing its results. Finally, Part IV analyzes the study's findings
in greater detail, exploring some of its more interesting potential implications.
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The second clause of Article VI of the Constitution, better known as the
Supremacy Clause, reads as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
7 Though there does not appear to be a hard figure, most observers believe the rate of
unanimity in courts of appeals cases in published decisions is roughly 90%. See Brian Z.
Tamanaha, Devising Rule of Law Baselines: The Next Step in Quantitative Studies of
Judging, THE LEGAL WORKSHOP - DuKE L.J. (Mar. 25, 2010), http://legalworkshop.org/
2010/03/25/2667 ("[T]ypically about 90 percent of federal appellate decisions . . . are
issued without a dissent.").
8 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 17-18.
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Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.9
The Supreme Court has long understood this language as dictating that when a
state law conflicts with federal law, the state law is inoperable-whether the state
law takes the form of a constitutional provision, statute, administrative regulation,
or common-law rule of liability.'o For instance, in the famous 1824 decision of
Gibbons v. Ogden," the Court held that the Federal Navigation Act of 1793
preempted a series of New York statutes that had granted two businessmen a
thirty-year monopoly on the operation of all steamboats in New York waters.' 2 As
Chief Justice Marshall reasoned, in cases where "acts of the State Legislatures ...
though enacted in the execution of acknowledged State powers, interfere with, or
are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution, or
some treaty made under the authority of the United States," the "act of Congress,
or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of
powers not controverted, must yield to it." 3
These basic understandings of the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of
preemption still govern today, though modern Supreme Court decisions have
tended to sort preemption cases into a handful of different categories. One such
category is express preemption, instances in which Congress has demarcated the
breadth of a federal statute's preemptive reach through an explicit statutory
provision.14 In these cases, the question turns on whether the statute's preemption
clause covers the state statute, regulation, or common-law rule of liability at issue.
More commonly, appellate litigation involves questions of implied preemption,
instances in which Congress's intent to displace state law might logically be
inferred from the terms of the federal statute. The Supreme Court has identified
9 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10 See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819) ("It is of the
very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and
so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own
operations from their own influence."). See also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 516 (1992) ("[S]ince our decision in [M'Culloch], it has been settled that state law that
conflicts with federal law is 'without effect."' (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S.
725, 746 (1981))).
" 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
12 See id at 18; LUCAs A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN
ELITE, 1789-2008, at 75-76 (2009).
13 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 211.
14 See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997) (holding that ERISA's
preemption clause, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), preempted a provision in Louisiana's
personal property ownership law); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,
391(1992) (holding that the preemption clause contained in the Airline Deregulation Act,
codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1), preempted a Texas law governing the advertising of
airline fares); see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 ("Congress' [preemptive] intent may be
'explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose."' (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977))).
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three general bases for drawing such an inference: (1) impossibility preemption,
when it is physically impossible for the regulated party to comply simultaneously
with state and federal law;' 5 (2) field preemption, when Congress has regulated a
field so extensively that it has left no room for state-law supplementation;16 and (3)
frustration of purpose (or obstacle) preemption, when the state law at issue
frustrates the purposes of (or stands as an obstacle to the objectives of) the relevant
federal regulatory scheme, taken as a whole.' 7
While these categories may be helpful in distinguishing the various means by
which Congress can signal the scope of its preemptive intent, they ultimately carry
no independent legal significance. As the Supreme Court has explained on several
occasions, "'[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in every pre-
emption case."18 More precisely, the question is always whether Congress intended
its regulatory scheme to displace the sort of state law at issue, regardless of
whether Congress indicated that intent in express or implied terms.
Given the inherently statute-specific nature of any preemption controversy,
particular preemption decisions tend to be narrow in their scope and limited in
their ramifications. As a result, unless the federal or state law at issue is
particularly important or happens to touch on a politically controversial topic,
15 See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) ("We
will find preemption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state
and federal law. . . ."); Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 209 (1991) ("When
it is impossible for an employer to comply with both state and federal requirements, this
Court has ruled -that federal law pre-empts that of the States."); Fla. Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) ("A holding of federal exclusion of
state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one
engaged in interstate commerce . . . .").
16 See, e.g., Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) ("Pre-emptive intent
may also be inferred if the scope of the statute indicates that Congress intended federal law
to occupy the legislative field . . . ."); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287
(1995) ("We have recognized that a federal statute implicitly overrides state law either
when the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field
exclusively .... ); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[T]he Act
of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." (citing
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941))).
17 See, e.g., Hines, 312 U.S. at 52 ("Our primary function is to determine whether,
under the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania's law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.").
18 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks v.
Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)); see also Altria Grp., 129 S.Ct. at 543; Pharm.
Research & Mfrs. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 684 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating that the touchstone in analyzing a preemption claim is the
intent of Congress (citing Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96
(1992))); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-38 (1990) ("[T]he question
whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional intent."
(alteration in original) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1984))).
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preemption cases receive relatively scant public attention. Of course, there are
important exceptions. Some recent preemption disputes have concerned states'
leeway to regulate in the field of immigration and naturalization;' 9 to use their
investment and procurement practices to express their moral objections to the
human rights records of foreign regimes; 20 to regulate automobile emissions in an
effort to reduce greenhouse gases; 21 and to regulate the labeling and marketing of
tobacco products, especially to minors.22
But such cases are not the norm. More common are cases like Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine,2 3 where the Supreme Court decided that the Federal Boat Safety
Act of 1971 (and the actions of the Coast Guard in administering the Act) did not
preempt a state common-law tort action in which the plaintiff claimed that a
particular power boat motor was unreasonably dangerous for lacking a propeller
guard.24. Or Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Shanklin,25 in which the Court
'9 See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 866 (9th Cir.
2009), cert. granted sub nom., Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 78 U.S.L.W. 3065
(U.S. June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115) (holding that the Legal Arizona Workers Act, which
forbids employers from hiring undocumented workers as a condition of retaining their
business licenses and which requires employers to use the E-Verify system for validating
the immigration status of their employees, is not preempted by federal law); United States
v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (enjoining those provisions of
Arizona's S.B. 1070 that (1) require all persons who have been arrested to have their
immigration status verified prior to release, (2) require police officers to make a reasonable
attempt to determine an individual's immigration status during any lawful stop, (3) make it
a misdemeanor for persons unlawfully present in the United States to apply for work, and
(4) permit police officers to make warrantless arrests when the officer has probable cause
to believe that the suspect has committed an offense rendering him removable); Lozano v.
City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that the federal
Immigration Reform and Control Act preempted a city ordinance that prohibited
employing, "harboring," or renting housing to undocumented aliens); Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, Sub-National Immigration Regulation and the Pursuit of Cultural Cohesion,
77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441 (2009).
20 See generally Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) ("The
statute generally bars state entities from buying goods or services from any person (defined
to include a business organization) identified on a 'restricted purchase list' of those doing
business with Burma."); Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 562 A.2d 720 (Md.
App. 1989) ("Baltimore City ordinances requiring that Baltimore City employee pension
systems divest their holdings in companies doing business in South Africa.").
21 See Miguel Bustillo, Stakes High as State Targets Greenhouse Gas from Cars, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at Al (describing a California law that imposes such regulations,
and the car industry's plan to enjoin enforcement on the ground that the law is preempted
by federal fuel economy standards).
22 See generally Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008); Rowe v. N.H. Motor
Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2000);
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1991).
23 537 U.S. 51 (2002).24 Id. at 62-70.
25 529 U.S. 344 (2000).
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held that the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, in conjunction with a Federal
Highway Administration regulation promulgated under the Act, preempted a state
tort action in which the plaintiff alleged that the railroad failed to maintain
adequate warning devices at a particular grade crossing in rural Tennessee.26 In
other words, the garden variety preemption decision is rather mundane.
The overall trajectory of preemption decisions is a different matter. As many
scholars have noted, federal preemption as a general issue is quite important to the
balance of federal and state power in our constitutional system.27 The fields
regulated by the federal government have grown dramatically over the last century,
such that federal law now reaches into most corners of everyday life. From crime
to environmental protection to corporate governance, federal law regulates private
conduct that generally was subject only to state control for the nation's first 150
years, from its founding until the advent of the New Deal.28 Granted, some of the
Supreme Court's recent decisions have narrowed the breadth of Congress's
legislative powers. 2 9 But they have done so only at the outermost edges. Congress
can still regulate any activity that is economic or commercial in nature, as well as
several activities that are not.30
26 Id. at 347.
27 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1313, 1326 (2004) ("Preempting state laws
limits the ability of states to make choices that are responsive to their residents' desires, to
experiment, and to advance liberty and freedom within their boundaries. Simply put, a
broad vision of inferred preemption invalidates beneficial state laws."); Brian Galle, Is
Local Consumer Protection Law a Better Redistributive Mechanism than the Tax System?,
65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525, 525 (2010) ("[P]reemption decisions are, at their core,
a choice about which tier of government should have policy-making authority."); Gillian E.
Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DuKE L.J. 2023, 2025-26 (2008)
("[A]dministrative preemption threatens to impose significant burdens on the ability of
states to exercise independent regulatory authority, a core concern of federalism."); Ernest
A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1, 31 (2004)
("[P]reemption cases are the quintessential autonomy cases. They concern whether the
states can regulate third parties within their own jurisdiction, pursuant to their own view of
the public interest, or whether that authority will be displaced by federal control.").
28 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REv. 405, 408 (1989) ("The New Deal period marked an enormous change in the
size and character of the national government.").
29 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating the
civil remedy provision in § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act as outside the
powers granted Congress by either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (invalidating the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act as an invalid use of the congressional power
enumerated in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 551 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 was beyond
Congress's enumerated powers).
30 As the Court clarified in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), noneconomic,
noncommercial, purely intrastate activities are still subject to federal regulation if Congress
rationally "concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut" a larger,
2292011]
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Thus, the vast majority of human activity in the United States is regulable by
both the federal government and the states. This means that the willingness of
courts to conclude that federal law displaces state law on the same subject is quite
important to the breadth and depth of the states' residuary powers, and hence to the
constitutional values that federalism is supposed to promote. As Justice Breyer
observed,
in today's world, filled with legal complexity, the true test of
federalist principle may lie, not in the occasional constitutional effort to
trim Congress' commerce power at its edges, or to protect a State's
treasury from a private damages action, but rather in those many
statutory cases where courts interpret the mass of technical detail that is
the ordinary diet of the law.3 1
While the values of federalism lurk in every preemption case-at least at the
level of structural principle-the more immediate, substantive consequences often
involve the stringency of government regulation imposed on private businesses. To
be sure, preemption cases encompass a wide variety of topics, many of which have
little or nothing to do with economic regulation.32 But the prototypical preemption
dispute presents the judge with a choice between holding (a) that a given aspect of
a business's activities is regulated exclusively by federal law, or (b) that the
activity is regulated by both federal and state law. In other words, the question is
usually how much regulation will govern a particular aspect of private enterprise.
comprehensive scheme that, taken as a whole, plainly regulates interstate commerce. Id. at
18. Moreover, Congress can cure any constitutionally deficient statute by adding a
"jurisdictional element"-language that ensures, on a case-by-case basis, that the regulated
activity has a sufficient connection to interstate commerce. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613;
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. In fact, this is precisely what happened in the wake of the Court's
decision in Lopez. A year later, Congress amended the Gun-Free.School Zone Act to add
eleven words to 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A), defining the relevant offense as the knowing
possession of "a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign
commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
school zone." Pub. L. No.104-208, § 657, 110 Stat. 3009-369, 3009-370 (1996) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A)) (emphasis added).
3 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160-61 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
32 See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 477-78
(2002) (addressing whether the "spousal impoverishment" provisions of the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act preempted a state's "income-first" approach to determining
Medicaid eligibility, which required that potential income transfers from the
institutionalized spouse be considered part of the "community spouse's income" for
purposes of determining whether a higher community spouse resource allowance was
necessary); Cal. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098, 1102, 1115 (9th Cir.
2010) (addressing whether a provision of the federal, Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(30)(A), preempts a state law reducing Medicaid reimbursement rates for health
care providers).
230 [No. 1
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For example, can a state impose common-law tort liability on a pharmaceutical
manufacturer for distributing a drug whose label has been approved by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), or is the FDA's regulation of the drug's
marketing exclusive? 33 Can a state hold a tobacco manufacturer liable for
fraudulent misrepresentation in connection with the sale of "light cigarettes," or is
the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act the only regulation with which it must
comply? 3 4 Can a state court declare unconscionable all contracts that forbid class-
wide arbitration, or is such a state common-law rule incompatible with the Federal
Arbitration Act?3 5 In substantive, practical terms, preemption cases typically
require judges to choose between results producing more or less regulation of
commercial activity.
It is these immediate practical consequences that render the partisan valence
of federal preemption uncertain. On the one hand, political conservatives (and thus
members of the Republican Party), as a matter of constitutional structure, tend to
prefer a smaller federal government and greater policy autonomy for the states.3 6
By contrast, Democrats have often opposed these ideas (at least as a matter of
judicial enforcement) and have been more comfortable affording Congress a wide
berth in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, it is conceivable that
Democrats would be more likely than Republicans to favor the federal preemption
of state law. Indeed, along the dimension of state autonomy, a Democratic
tendency to support federal power and a Republican tendency to favor state
autonomy would match the behavior of the Supreme Court in its recent spate of
federalism decisions concerning the limits on Congress's enumerated powers-
cases involving the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh
Amendment, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In these areas, the
Court's more conservative justices have consistently favored outcomes enhancing
the sovereignty or policy autonomy of the states, while the more liberal justices
have embraced a broader vision of national power.38
On the other hand, decisions favoring federal preemption tend to reduce the
stringency of government regulation imposed on private businesses. And a
centerpiece of modern Republican philosophy has been a faith in free markets-a
conviction that private ordering tends to better serve social welfare than
government regulation. 9 Preemption usually constrains the capacity of state or
33 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009).
34 See generally Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
35 See Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010).
36 This has been reflected in Republican Party platforms over the past 30-years. See
Bradley W. Joondeph, Federalism, the Rehnquist Court, and the Modern Republican Party,
87 OR. L. REV. 117, 158-60 (2008); J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The
Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 233, 238
(2004).
37 See Pickerill & Clayton, supra note 36, at 237-38.
38 See id. at 236-37.
39 See id. at 238-47.
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local governments to regulate particular business activities more rigorously than
the federal government, and it often eliminates a means of redress under state tort
40law for persons alleging injuries from those activities. It is no secret that the
Democratic Party has generally favored the preservation of such state-level
regulation, particularly in the form of tort actions initiated by plaintiffs.4 1 Thus, it
is likewise conceivable that Republican appointees would vote in favor of
preemption more frequently than Democratic appointees.
Hence, the partisan dimensions of preemption controversies in the federal
courts are not facially obvious because ideological currents pull Republican and
Democratic judges in both directions. And this uncertainty raises some interesting
empirical questions. Specifically, is there a meaningful difference in the voting
records of Republican and Democratic appellate judges in cases asking whether
federal law preempts state law? And if so, what is the nature and size of that
difference? The following section seeks to answer these ques'tions, presenting -a
study of how federal circuit court judges voted in more than five hundred
preemption decisions from 2004 to 2009.
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
A. Politics, Judicial Decision Making, and the Courts ofAppeals
At least in the field of political science, scholars have long recognized a
measurable association between appellate judges' political affiliations and their
decision making.42 The principal reason is that the resolution of many legal
questions requires the exercise of discretion. The authoritative sources of law-the
relevant text, history, tradition, precedent, and the like-are often too
indeterminate to dictate singularly correct answers. This indeterminacy leaves
40 See generally Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding that the
FDA's premarket approval process under the Medical Device Amendments to the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempted state common-law claims of negligence, strict liability,
and implied warranty against a device manufacturer); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding the Department of Transportation standard concerning
automobile passive restraints preempted state common law tort actions against
manufacturers for the failure to equip a particular model with airbags); Campo v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 562 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that federal law preempts any state tort
claims arising from claims handled by a carrier participating in the National Flood
Insurance Program); Port City Props. v. Union Pac. R.R., 518 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act completely preempts state
tort claims against a railroad for ceasing rail service over spurs or industrial tracks).
41 For example, Democrats in Congress have consistently resisted federal legislative
efforts to cap damage awards in various types of tort actions, such as medical malpractice.
See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Class-Action Legislation Fails in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct
23, 2003, at A23; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Democrats Block Caps for Malpractice,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb 25, 2004, at A16.
42 See TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 84-85, 101-31
(1999).
232 [No. I
HeinOnline  -- 2011 Utah L. Rev. 232 2011
PARTISAN DIMENSIONS
judges with considerable freedom to wander, unencumbered by authoritative
instructions. And in exercising this discretion, judges-like all human beings-are
inevitably influenced by their own predispositions-their deeply ingrained beliefs
and values. In the decision-making process, a judge's own policy preferences
affect her behavior, even when she sincerely believes she is merely acting as a
servant of the law.
It remains an open question as to exactly how much of the variance in judicial
behavior is explained by a judge's personal ideology-that is, we are still trying to
pin down what proportion of judicial decision making is "law," what proportion is
"politics," and what proportion is attributable to still other factors. This question is
further complicated because investigators are not always precise in how they
define "politics" in this context.43 A "political" influence on judging might refer to
the personal, political ideology of the judge;" to 'the policy priorities of the
political coalition that placed the judge in office; 4 5 to external political pressures
brought to bear on a judge after she has taken office;4 6 or to a variety of other
mechanisms by which the American political system, at large, shapes the agenda
and decision making of the judiciary.47 No doubt, the interactions between law and
politics are varied and complex. But these complications do not obscure a basic
truth: the empirical evidence of a connection between judges' political affiliations
and their voting records on the bench is simply overwhelming. As a prominent
political scientist recently explained, "an extensive body of research confirms that
a judge's personal political attitudes strongly influence his or her decisions.8
Much of the research documenting this association has focused on the
Supreme Court, precisely the place we would expect to see it most readily.
Because the Court's merits docket is almost completely discretionary, the justices
generally grant review only of those cases presenting questions on which lower
courts have disagreed. As a result, the issues invariably are quite difficult, with
persuasive legal arguments on both sides. And this means that the justices enjoy a
43 See generally Bradley W. Joondeph, The Many Meanings of "Politics" in Judicial
Decision Making, 77 UMKC L. REv. 347 (2009) (exploring the "many possible meanings
of 'politics' in descriptions of judicial behavior").
4 See id. at 349-55.
4 5 See id. at 355-57.
4 6 See id. at 370-71.
47 See id. at 348-70.
48 Fiank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U S. Circuit Courts ofAppeals, 91 CALIF.
L. REv. 1457, 1482 (2003) ("The weight of the empirical evidence clearly reveals some
role for ideology in judicial decisionmaking."); Terri Jennings Peretti, Does Judicial
Independence Exist? The Lessons of Social Science Research, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 103, 109-11 (Stephen B.
Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002); see also Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court
Deference to Congress: An Examination of the Marksist Model, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 237, 237 (Cornell W. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds., 1999) ("No serious scholar of the judiciary denies that the decisions
of judges, especially at the Supreme Court level, are at least partially influenced by the
judges' ideology.").
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great deal of discretion-much more discretion in deciding legal questions than
any other judges in the American legal system. The Court's power to control its
merits docket also means that it generally decides cases that are, comparatively
speaking, controversial and politically salient. Thus, the subject matter of the
issues which the Court takes on makes it more likely that the justices' ideological
leanings will come to the fore and influence their decision making.
By contrast, United States court of appeals judges face more institutional
constraints, and their typical decision lacks much political significance. Federal
circuit courts are required to review every appeal taken from a final judgment
issued by a United States district court.4 9 And in deciding these cases, they are
hemmed in by a thicker web of precedent, consisting not just of Supreme Court
decisions (which are more binding on the courts of appeals than on the Supreme
Court itself) but also of the circuit court's own decisions and, to a large degree, the
decisions of its sister circuits. In the mine run of cases, these constraints make the
behavior of circuit court judges, comparatively speaking, less susceptible to the
influence of their ideological preferences.
But this is not to say that court of appeals judges lack discretion on questions
of law, or that their decisions are unaffected by their political commitments. Scores
of studies have established a significant correlation between the political
affiliations of circuit court judges and their voting behavior. Consider the
following:
* Thirty-five years ago, Sheldon Goldman established that the party of
the appointing president explained a substantial portion of the variance in
circuit judges' voting records on several issues, including criminal
procedure, civil liberties, and labor.o
* In an important 1998 study, Tracey George found, among other things,
that "the majority of circuit judges participating in en banc cases vote
their sincere policy preferences, or ideology, without constraint from
their colleagues or the Supreme Court."5
* A widely discussed book by Cass Sunstein and three co-authors,
published in 2006, found statistically significant differences in the voting
records of Republican and Democratic circuit judges in eighteen discrete
categories of cases, including state immunity from damages actions
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (providing, inter alia, that "[t]he courts of appeals
(other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States").
50 Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals
Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 491, 501 (1975).
5 Tracey George, Developing a Positive Theory ofDecisionmaking on US. Courts of
Appeals, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1635, 1684 (1998).
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under the Eleventh Amendment, actions by the Environmental Protection
Agency, and restrictions on campaign financing.52
* Frank Cross's 2007 book, Decision Making in the U.S. Court of
Appeals, presented a thorough examination of several potential
influences on circuit court decisions and concluded that, using a variety
of approaches to test the question, "[t]he results are fairly consistent in
showing some effect of ideology that is typically a statistically
significant association."53
This list only scratches the surface. Scores of other studies have established similar
patterns across a wide variety of legal subjects.54
To my knowledge, though, no scholar has yet examined whether this
association extends to cases involving the federal preemption of state law-and if
so, in which direction the connection runs. The omission is unfortunate, given
(1) the significance of preemption cases as a proportion of the dockets of the courts
52 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 17-57.
The full list of issue areas in which the investigators found statistically
significant differences between Republicans and Democrats is as follows: gay
and lesbian rights, affirmative action, those implicating the National
Environmental Policy Act, capital punishment, state immunity under the.
Eleventh Amendment, those challenging the decisions of the National Labor
Relations Board, sex discrimination, disability discrimination, abortion,
campaign finance, piercing the corporate veil, those involving the
Environmental Protection Agency, obscenity, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
racial desegregation, those challenging actions by the Federal Communications
Commission, the Contracts Clause, and commercial speech cases under the First
Amendment.
Id.
53 FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 38 (2007).
54 See generally Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by
President Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298 (1993); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Jon Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48 (1986);
Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-analysis,
20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and
the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997); Jeffrey Segal et al., Decision Making on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 227 (L. Epstein et al. eds., 1995);
Christopher E. Smith, Polarization and Change in the Federal Courts: En Banc Decisions
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 74 JUDICATURE 133 (1990); Donald R. Songer & Martha
Humphries Ginn, Assessing the Impact of Presidential and Home State Influences on
Judicial Decisionmaking in the United States Courts of Appeals, 55 POL.- RES. Q. 299
(2002); Ronald Stidham et al., The Voting Behavior of President Clinton's Judicial
Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16 (1996).
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of appeals, and (2) the importance of these decisions (at least in aggregate) to the
federal-state balance in our constitutional system. This study endeavors to fill this
gap, at least in part.
B. Study Design
The central purpose of the study was to assess whether there is a significant
difference in the voting records of Republican and Democratic appointees to the
United States Courts of Appeals in preemption cases.ss To pursue this objective, I
(with the help of several research assistants) created a unique data set consisting of
every preemption decision rendered by one of the thirteen federal circuit courtS56
from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2009." Each decision was coded for six
dependent variables: (1) the court deciding the case, (2) the participating judges,
(3) the president who appointed each of the judges, (4) whether the decision was
unanimous, (5) the partisan composition of the panel, and (6) whether the decision
was published. The independent variable was the direction of each judge's vote:
ss For purposes of the study, I defined a "preemption case" as any decision on the
merits in which the circuit court resolved whether a federal statute or a regulation
promulgated by a federal agency pursuant to such a statute precluded the application of a
state statute, state regulation, state common law rule of liability, or state constitutional
provision. This is not the only possible conception of federal preemption; it might also
include, for instance, cases in which states are forbidden from regulating in a certain field
(e.g., foreign affairs) because the subject matter is constitutionally allocated to the national
government. My definition, though, captures the typical preemption case and thus includes
the overwhelming majority of decisions that one might describe as involving federal
preemption.
56 I identified the cases included in the study in the following manner. First, I
conducted searches in Westlaw's database for all the courts of appeals of the United States
(CTA) or the court-specific databases (e.g., CTAl for the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit) searching for forms of the word "preempt" or preemption" in the
headnotes of the opinion. Thus, I ran the query "hn(preempt! pre-empt!)" with the relevant
date restriction.
Second, one of my research assistants or I examined the content of each opinion
generated by the query to determine whether the court's holding-its ultimate legal
judgment in the case-concerned the federal preemption of state law, as defined above. In
many instances it did not, as the opinion simply referred to preemption without actually
deciding a preemption issue. Such cases were excluded from the data set.
Third, one of my research assistants or I coded the opinions for the relevant
independent variables and the dependant variable, entering this information into Excel
spreadsheets.
Finally, I reexamined the data and the text of several opinions for coding errors,
making corrections and adjustments as warranted.
5 I selected the time frame of the study largely for purposes of convenience. The
object of the study was to evaluate how federal judges are voting currently, so I wanted the
cases to be as recent as possible. Five-years of decisions were roughly what my research
assistants and I had the capacity to review and code.
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whether it supported or rejected the outcome resulting in the federal preemption of
state law.
The data set is unique in two respects. First, it has culled the decisions based
on whether the preemption of state law by a federal statute or regulation was at
issue. Other United States court of appeals databases, though offering a wealth of
useful ways to study the circuit courts, have not coded decisions for this
characteristic. Second, this data set is comprehensive over the period of inquiry. It
includes all 560 preemption decisions issued by the federal circuit courts in the
years 2005 through 2009.
Because the question I sought to answer was whether two independent
proportions were meaningfully different-one proportion being the percentage of
votes by Republican appointees favoring preemption, the other being the
percentage of similar votes by Democratic appointees-I employed a two-tailed,
two-sample Z-test to measure the statistical significance of the observed
differences.5 9 The null hypothesis-the hypothesis that there is no significant
difference between two populations, which a statistical study then seeks to test-
was that there is no difference between how Republican and Democrat judges vote
on the issue of federal preemption of state law. As a baseline, I used a 95% level of
confidence as a threshold for significance-that is, for concluding that any
observed difference was real, and not just the product of random chance. Thus, a
finding of statistical significance means that if the null hypothesis is true, there is
less than a 5% chance that we would see the observed difference.
Several cases included in the data set raised multiple preemption issues within
the same decision. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association v. Rowe60 is a
good example. There, a trade association representing air and motor carriers sued
the Attorney General of Maine seeking a declaration that the Maine Tobacco
Delivery Law, which required persons delivering tobacco products directly to
consumers to take several precautions to ensure that the products were not being
purchased by minors, was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994.6' The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
(1) those requirements in Maine's law concerning the method by which carriers
must deliver packages that might affect the timeliness of deliveries were
preempted, but that (2) the Maine law's ban on the knowing transportation of
contraband tobacco products into Maine was not.62 In such instances, I coded a
judge who favored preemption on some but not all of the issues as lodging half of
a vote for each result. No doubt, there are other defensible ways of coding such
58 The data set is freely available for download as an Excel spreadsheet. See Bradley
W. Joondeph, PUBSOOO-Preemption Data Set (Fall 2010)-Joondeph, SANTA CLARA L.
CLARANET, http://claranet.scu.eduleres/coursepage.aspx?cid=293 I &page=docs# (last
visited Nov. 10, 2010).
59 For further explanation of this measure, see infra note 70.
60 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006), overruled in part by 552 U.S. 364 (2008).
61 Id. at 69.
62 Id. at 82.
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votes. But this approach is consistent with the methodology of other empirical
studies of judicial behavior in preemption cases,6 and it avoids overemphasizing
particular preemption decisions that happen to raise multiple issues.
A final point about methodology: because the study attempts to draw
conclusions about the judges' behavior by tallying their votes favoring one
outcome or another, it suffers from the shortcomings inherent in any vote-
counting, outcome-focused approach. First, it ignores what the judges actually
wrote in their opinions. And the content of the opinions can be just as important-
sometimes much more important-than whether the judgment under review was
affirmed, reversed, or vacated. 6 Second, it places equal weight on each decision,
even though some cases are clearly more significant than others. But these
weaknesses should not be overstated. Outcomes may be a crude measure of the
judiciary's decisional output,67 but they can still reveal a great deal about the
patterns of judicial behavior. Moreover, focusing on outcomes allows us to record
the judges' positions quite objectively, reducing the potential for bias in our data
collection. While outcome-based studies certainly cannot answer all of the
interesting questions about judicial decision making, 8 they nonetheless can shed
significant light on the subject.69
C. Results
From January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2009, the United States Courts of
Appeals decided 560 cases addressing whether federal law preempted state law,
420 of which resulted in published opinions and 140 of which were decided by
unpublished disposition. More than 98% of these cases (551) were decided by
three-judge panels; three were decided en banc, and six were decided by just two
judges (either because the third judge did not reach the preemption question on the
merits, or because a judge passed away between oral argument and the decision's
release). In this full universe of preemption decisions, the difference in the voting
records of Republican and Democratic appointees was only slight. Judges
63 For instance, one could treat each individual preemption issue (or claim) as a
separate decision, and thus a distinct vote.
6 See, e.g., Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court:
A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 55, 93-94 (2006).
65 On the weaknesses inherent in such studies, see Frank B. Cross et al., The Reagan
Revolution in the Network of Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1235 (2008); Friedman, supra
note 4, at 265-66.
66 See Friedman, supra note 4, at 266 (discussing the importance of the content of the
Supreme Court's opinions in evaluating the significance of the Court's work).
67 See Cross et al., supra note 65, at 1235.68 See Friedman, supra note 4, at 265-66.
69 See Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test
the "Legal Model" of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 465, 494-96
(2001) (describing the importance of such studies, even if they should be supplemented
with historical and interpretivist inquiries).
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appointed by Republican presidents voted in favor of preemption more frequently
than judges appointed by Democratic presidents, but only by a margin of roughly
2.6% (57.35% versus 54.71%), a difference that was not statistically significant.70
In published decisions, the difference between Republicans and Democrats was
slightly larger (about 5.1%), but it, too, lacked statistical significance at a 95%
level of confidence. 7 1 (Both Republican and Democratic judges were much more
likely to find in favor of preemption in cases decided with unpublished
dispositions than in those decided with published opinions.)
Table 1. Percentage of Votes by United States Court of Appeals Judges in
Favor of Preemption, 2005-2009
Type of Decision Republican Democratic
(#of decisions) Appointees Appointees
Votes Percentage Votes Percentage
All Preemption 1014 57.35% 690 54.71%
Decisions (560)
Published Preemption 783 53.70% 506 48.62%
Decisions (420)
Unpublished Preemption 231 69.70% 184 71.47%
Decisions (140) 1
Importantly, this partisan similarity in overall voting records was not the
product of Republican and Democratic appointees voting differently in different
groups of decisions-those where, alternatively, Republicans and Democrats
70 Again, to determine statistical significance, I used a two-tailed, difference of
proportions Z-test. See DAVID S. MOORE, THE BASIC PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 504-07,
521-24 (4th ed. 2007). The Z-test is applied in the following fashion. First, the standard
deviation of the difference (SD) is the square root of (((PI x (1- Pl)(1- Pl)(1- Pl)(1- Pl)(1-
Pl)(1- Pl)(1- P1)) + N,) + (P 2 x (1- P2)(l- P2)(1- P2)(1- P2)(1- P2)(1- P2)(1- P2)) + N2),
where P, is the first proportion, P2 is the second proportion, N is the number of trials (or
votes) out of which P, is a proportion, and N2 is the number of trials (or votes) out of which
P2 is a proportion. The Z-value for the difference equals (PI - P2) + SD. At the P = 0.05
level of confidence (where there is a 95% chance that the difference in the proportions is
not the result of random chance), Z = 1.96. Thus, a Z-value of 1.96 or higher means
statistical significance at the level of P = 0.05. At the P = 0.01 level of confidence (where
there is a 99% chance that the difference in the proportions is not the result of random
chance), Z = 2.58. Thus, a Z value of 2.58 or higher means statistical significance at the
P = 0.01 level. See id. The Z-value for the difference between Republican and Democratic
appointees in all preemption cases is 1.077, well below the threshold for statistical
significance.
71 The Z-value for these two proportions is 1.672, yielding a confidence level of
90.5%. This means that, if the null hypothesis (that there is no difference between how
Republican and Democrat judges vote on the issue of preemption) is true, there is a 9.5%
chance that we would see the observed difference.
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favored preemption disproportionately, such that their divergent voting patterns
canceled each other out in aggregate. Rather, preemption appears to be an area of
above-average consensus on the courts of appeals. Of the 560 cases in the data set,
533 (more than 95%) involved no dissent, at least on the question of preemption.
Even when the panel was of mixed-party composition-comprising at least one
Republican appointee and one Democratic appointee-more than 94.5% of the
cases were resolved unanimously.
Table 2. Rates of Unanimity in United States Courts of Appeals Preemption
Decisions, by Type of Decision, 2005-2009
Type of Decision Proportion of Cases
(# of decisions) Decided Unanimously
All Decisions (560) 95.18%
Published Decisions (420) 94.29%
Unpublished Decisions (140) 97.87%
Decisions by Mixed-Party Panels (384) 94.53%
Decisions by Same-Party Panels (176) 96.59%
Though disagreement in preemption decisions was rare, it occurred
disproportionately in cases decided by mixed-party panels. That is, while most
mixed-party panels were unanimous, they were also the place where disagreement
was more likely to occur. Given the small number of non-unanimous decisions,
however, the difference between the proportion of non-unanimous opinions
decided by mixed-party panels and the proportion of all decisions decided by
mixed-party panels was not statistically significant.72
Table 3. Proportions of United States Courts of Appeals Preemption
Decisions, by Panel Composition, 2005-2009
Type of Panel Proportion of All Proportion of
(# of decisions) Decisions (560) Non-unanimous
Decisions (27)
Mixed-party panels (384) 68.57% 77.78%
Same-party panels (176) 31.43% 22.22%
Though the overall partisan differences were quite small, when we focus on
this small proportion of preemption decisions where at least one judge registered a
dissent, we find a stark divide between Republicans and Democrats. It was even
more pronounced (though just slightly so) in those non-unanimous decisions where
at least one Republican and one Democrat served on the panel-cases in which
Republicans and Democrats were exposed to precisely the same case stimuli. Here,
Republican appointees were roughly 3.5 times more likely than Democrats to vote
72 The Z-value for the difference between these proportions is 1.118.
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in favor of preemption. These differences are statistically significant at a 99% level
of confidence.7 3
Table 4. Percentage of Votes by United States Court of Appeals Judges in
Favor of Preemption in Non-unanimous Decisions, 2005-2009
Type of Decisions Republican Democratic
(# of decisions) Ap >ointees Appointees
Votes Percentage Votes Percentage
All Non-unanimous Decisions (27) 44 69.32% 49 23.47%
Non-unanimous Decisions with 35 72.86% 40 21.25%
Mixed-party Panels (21)
As to the legal content of these cases, the question presented in all twenty-one
non-unanimous mixed-party decisions, in one way or another, involved the validity
of a state regulation imposed on private business activity. For example, Retail
Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder,74 addressed whether the Earned
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempted Maryland's Fair Share
Health Care Fund Act, requiring businesses that employed more than ten thousand
employees and that spent less than 8% of their total compensation costs on health
insurance to pay a specified premium to the state. Similarly, Colacicco v. Apotex,
Inc.,75 concerned whether the FDA's regulatory actions impliedly preempted state
product liability actions against pharmaceutical manufacturers for their failure to
warn consumers of an increased risk of adult suicide associated with their drug.
Table 5 lists all twenty-one non-unanimous mixed-panel decisions and the issues
they resolved.
7 The Z-value for the difference of the proportions in all non-unanimous cases is
3.908. The Z-value for the difference of the proportions in non-unanimous cases, in which
at least one Republican and one Democrat participated, is 4.025. With respect to both, if
the null hypothesis (that there is no difference between how Republican and Democratic
judges vote on the issue of preemption) is true, there is a less than 1% chance that we
would see the observed difference.
74 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007).
1 521 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2008).
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Table 5. Non-unanimous Preemption Decisions Decided by Mixed-Party
Panels, 2005-2009
Case Name Court Year Issue
Greene v. B.F. Whether federal aviation safety law preempts
Goodrich CA6 2005 a state-law failure-to-warn claim against the
Avionics Sys., manufacturer of an allegedly defectively
Inc. 76 designed gyroscope.
Empire Health Whether the Federal Employees Health
Choice CA2 2005 Benefits Act preemption clause grants
Assurance, Inc. subject matter jurisdiction to federal district
v. McVeigh" courts in a contract dispute between two
private parties where one party's anticipated
defenses are subject to preemption.
Air Whether federal law preempts state appliance
Conditioning & CA9 2005 regulations requiring manufacturers to
Refrigeration submit data about their appliances, mark
Inst. v. Energy their appliances with basic information, and
Res. be subject to enforcement rules.
Conservation
& Dev.
Comm 'n78
Sherwood Whether the federal Bankruptcy Code
Partners, Inc. CA9 2005 preempts a state law giving an assignee
v. Lycos, Inc.79 selected by the debtor the power to void
preferential transfers that could not be voided
by an unsecured creditor.
Varghese v. Whether a party may raise ERISA
Honeywell CA4 2005 preemption claims on appeal following a full
mt 'iP trial when the party failed to raise those
claims at trial.
Levine v. Whether ERISA's saving clause applies to a
United CA3 2005 state law that permits the inclusion of
Healthcare reimbursement and subrogation clauses in
Corp.81 health insurance contracts.
76 409 F.3d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2005).
" 396 F.3d 136, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2005).
78410 F.3d 492, 494-95 (9th Cir. 2005).
79 394 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005).
80 424 F.3d 411, 413 (4th Cir. 2005).
81 402 F.3d 156, 158-59 (3d Cir. 2005).
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BankWest, Inc. Whether the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
v. Baker82  CAll 2005 preempts a state law that prohibits payday
stores from acting as agents for out-of-state
banks charging in excess of a state-mandated
interest cap if the store has a predominate
economic interest in the loan revenues.
Pinney v. Whether the Federal Communications Act
Nokia8 1 CA4 2005 expressly preempts consumers' state-law tort
claims related to the manufacture and sale of
wireless telephones.
Riegel v. Whether the Medical Device Amendments to
Medtronic, CA2 2006 the FDCA preempt common-law tort claims
Inc. 84  against the manufacturer of an allegedly
defective medical device.
Chamber of Whether the National Labor Relations Act
Commerce v. CA9 2006 preempts state-law restrictions on a private
Lockyer8 5  company's use of state funds for union-
related speech.
Peace v. Am. Whether ERISA preempts a breach of
Gen. Life Ins. CA5 2006 contract claim by an employee against his
Co.8 6  employer for failing to provide a single-
premium annuity.
Erpelding v. Whether the defendant was an ERISA
Delaware CA9 2006 fiduciary, such that ERISA would preempt
Charter Guar. state-law claims against the benefit plan
& Trust Co." administrator.
Retail Indus. Whether ERISA preempts a state law
Leaders Ass' CA4 2007 requiring businesses of 10,000 or more
v. Fielder" employees to expend a fixed percentage of
total wages on health insurance.
House v. Am. Whether ERISA preempts a state law's
United Life Ins. CA5 2007 imposition of penalties or award of
Co. 89  attorney's fees in connection with a claim
arising under the disability policy of an
employee benefit plan.
82 411 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005).
83 402 F.3d 430, 439 (4th Cir. 2005).
84 451 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2006).
8 463 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006).
86 462 F.3d 437, 438 (5th Cir. 2006).
162 F. App'x 730, 731 (9th Cir. 2006).
88 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007).
89 499 F.3d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 2007).
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90 510 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
9' 489 F.3d 594, 597 (4th Cir. 2007).
92 507 F.3d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 2007).
93 488 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2007).
94 521 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2008).
95 589 F.3d 274, 284 (6th Cir. 2009).
96 580 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Clearing House Whether OCC regulations interpreting the
Ass 'n v. CA2 2007 visitorial powers provision of the National
Cuomo 90  Bank Act preempted state investigation and
enforcement of national banks' compliance
with otherwise non-preempted state laws.
Discover Bank Whether the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
v. Vaden91 CA4 2007 completely preempts state usury law claims
of a cardholder against a state chartered,
federally insured bank.
Wah Chang v. Whether the "filed rate doctrine" precludes
Duke Energy CA9 2007 state-law claims that challenge the practices
Trading & of companies connected with their charging
Afktg. 9 2  of FERC-approved electricity rates.
WWC Holding Whether the Telecommunications Act
Co. v. Sopkin93  CAl0 2007 expressly preempts a state from exercising
authority over carriers when the regulation
affects components in interstate commerce.
Colacicco v. Whether the FDA's labeling requirements for
Apotex, Inc.94  CA3 2008 antidepressant medications preempt a state-
law failure-to-warn claim against a drug
manufacturer.
Monroe Retail, Whether the National Bank Act's grant of
Inc. v. RBS CA6 2009 authority to national banks to charge and
Citizens, N.A. 95  collect fees preempts state-law conversion
claims brought pursuant to state garnishment
statutes.
Saleh v. Titan Whether the combatant activities exception
Corp.9 6  CADC 2009 to the Federal Tort Claims Act preempts
state-law tort claims arising out of a
contractor's alleged involvement in the abuse
of detainees in Iraq.
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If we widen our lens back out to the full universe of preemption decisions, we
see little difference among the judges' voting records based on the identity of the
appointing president, a finding that is unsurprising given the general lack of
partisan disparities. In the full run of cases, judges appointed by Presidents Carter
and Clinton voted in favor of preemption at lower rates than judges appointed by
Presidents Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush, but only by small
margins-differences that are not statistically significant, even at a 90% level of
confidence." It is noteworthy, however, that although Clinton appointees were
largely indistinguishable from Republican appointees overall, they were quite
different in non-unanimous cases, casting only 15% of such votes in favor of
preemption. The same was true of George W. Bush appointees, but in the opposite
direction; they voted for preemption at a rate of 82% in non-unanimous cases. The
sample sizes for Clinton and George W. Bush appointees in non-unanimous cases
are very small, so we should not infer much from these findings. Nevertheless, the
data are consistent with what we see elsewhere: a very significant partisan split at
the margin, despite broad consensus on the issue writ large.
Table 6. Percentage of Votes by United States Court of Appeals Judges in
Favor of Preemption, by Appointing President, 2005-2009
Appointing President All Decisions Non-unanimous
Decisions
Votes Percentage Votes Percentage
Judges Appointed by 188 53.19% 13 34.62%
President Carter
Judges Appointed by 341 57.33% 14 64.29%
President Reagan
Judges Appointed by 221 55.88% 14 71.43%
President G.H.W. Bush
Judges Appointed by 483 54.45% 27 14.81%
President Clinton
Judges Appointed by 397 58.44% 14 82.14%
President G.W. Bush
Comparing the voting records of Republicans and Democrats across various
panel compositions also illustrates the large degree of partisan consensus in
preemption decisions. Regardless of the partisan makeup of the panel, Republicans
and Democrats voted in favor of preemption at very similar rates. With the
exception of en banc and two-judge panel decisions-categories for which the
number of decisions was extremely small-Republican and Democratic judges did
not differ in any particular panel composition by more than 3.5%. Indeed,
97 The largest difference is that between Carter appointees (53.19%) and George W.
Bush appointees (58.44%), and the Z-value for this difference is only 1.193.
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Republicans on all-Republican panels voted in favor of preemption at a rate nearly
identical to that of Democrats on all-Democrat panels (51.28% versus 48.86%).
The one possible indication of partisan influence is the apparent shift in the
behavior of Democrats. That is, Democrats seemed more likely to vote against
preemption as the panel became more Democratic, a pattern suggesting the
existence of ideological "panel effects"-the tendency of like-minded individuals,
when deliberating in an ideologically homogenous group, to reinforce one
another's biases. For reasons discussed in Part III.C infra, however, these apparent
panel effects are likely a mirage-the coincidental product of factors unrelated to
the panel's composition.
Table 7. Percentage of Votes by United States Court of Appeals Judges in
Favor of Preemption, by Panel Composition, 2005-2009
Partisan Composition of Panel Republican Democratic
(# of decisions) Appointees Appointees
Votes Percentage Votes Percentage
3 Republicans (130) 390 51.28% -_-
2 Republicans & 1 Democrat (223) 446 63.00% 223 60.76%
1 Republican & 2 Democrats (154) 154 60.06% 308 56.66%
3 Democrats (44) 
__-_132 48.86%
En banc Panels (3) 16 18.75% 24 0.00%
2-judge Panels (6 ) 8 62.50% 4 75.00%
Finally, sorting the data by the court of decision reveals some interesting
variances, though the small sample sizes should make us cautious in drawing
conclusions. In a majority of the circuits (seven of thirteen), Democrats actually
voted in favor of preemption more frequently than Republicans, and by a wide
margin in two courts (the First and Tenth Circuits). Moreover, Democrats on some
courts (such as the Eighth Circuit) were more likely to vote in favor of preemption
than Republicans on most other courts. And Republicans on some courts (such as
the First and Sixth Circuits) were more likely to vote against preemption than
Democrats on most other courts. Given its size, the Ninth Circuit accounted for
almost one-fourth of the preemption decisions of the courts of appeals over this
time frame (133 of the 560). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Ninth Circuit judges voted in
favor of preemption much less frequently than the overall average; the rate for the
Ninth Circuit was 49.76%, compared to 58.45% for all other judges combined; a
difference that was statistically significant even at a 99% level of confidence.98
98 The Z-value for this difference is 3.099.
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Table 8. Proportion of Votes in Favor of Preemption by Court of Decision,
2005-2009
Court Republicans Democrats Total
(# of Votes Percentage Votes Percentage Votes Percentage
decisions)
First 61 41.80% 23 65.22% 84 48.21%
Circuit (28)
Second 81 67.28% 74 54.05% 155 60.97%
Circuit (52)
Third 70 75.00% 46 52.17% 116 65.95%
Circuit (39)
Fourth 59 57.63% 19 42.11% 78 53.85%
Circuit (26)
Fifth 130 48.85% 58 53.45% 188 50.27%
Circuit (63)
Sixth 109 44.50% 79 54.43% 188 48.67%
Circuit (60)
Seventh 85 67.06% 32 51.56% 117 62.82%
Circuit (39)
Eighth 115 68.70% 37 71.16% 152 69.41%
Circuit (51)
Ninth 170 51.18% 249 48.79% 419 49.76%
Circuit (133)
Tenth 54 45.37% 21 73.81% 75 53.33%
Circuit (25)
Eleventh 47 62.77% 34 66.18% 81 64.20%
Circuit (27) * .
D.C. 20 85.00% 4 75.00% 24 83.33%
Circuit (8)
Federal 13 69.23% 13 84.62% 26 76.92%
Circuit (9)
IV. DISCUSSION
Overall, these data reveal several interesting patterns, but two core themes
stand above the others. The first is bipartisan consensus. In the vast majority of
preemption cases, United States court of appeals decisions were unanimous.
Indeed, the rate of unanimity in preemption cases (over 95%) exceeds most
estimates for the rate at which the circuit courts decide cases unanimously in
general. While Republicans voted in favor of preemption at a rate exceeding that
for'Democrats, the margin was slight (around 2.6%). Thus, preemption is unlike a
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number of other legal issues handled by the courts of appeals, for which recent
studies have found significant partisan voting differences. 99
The second theme concerns what happened at the margin--cases in which
presumably the lack of controlling legal authority, and perhaps the underlying
subject matter of the dispute, led to judicial disagreement. Though the proportion
of preemption cases fitting this description was small, these decisions revealed a
sizable partisan divide: Republicans were far more likely than Democrats to vote in
favor of preemption. Thus, while consensus generally carried the day, when it did
not, the disagreement almost always entailed Republican judges voting in favor of
preemption and Democratic judges voting against it.
Aside from these basic conclusions, three other findings warrant brief
discussion as well: (1) the consistency of these results with the recent behavior of
the Supreme Court; (2) the differences in voting patterns across the federal circuit
courts; and (3) the possible "panel effects" reflected in the voting patterns, at least
among Democrats. The following section addresses these topics in turn.
A. Comparison to the Supreme Court
One point worth noting is that the story of preemption in the courts of appeals,
at least in its broad outlines, is quite similar to that at the Supreme Court over its
past eighteen terms. From October Term 1991 (when Justice Thomas joined the
Court) through October Term 2008 (ending in June 2009), the Supreme Court
decided sixty-four preemption cases on the merits following full briefing and oral
argument.oo The justices were unanimous in thirty-one of these decisions (48.4%),
a rate well above that for its merits docket as a whole (somewhere between 32%
and 42%, depending on how one classifies decisions in which a justice concurs
only in the judgment). 0 1 Of course, a 48% unanimity rate falls well below that for
99 For instance, the SUNSTEIN ET AL. study found statistically significant differences in
the voting patterns of Republican and Democratic judges on the courts of appeals in
eighteen different issue areas: affirmative action, the National Environmental Policy Act,
capital punishment, the abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity, decisions by the
National Labor Relations Board, sex discrimination, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
sexual harassment, abortion, campaign finance, piercing the corporate veil, cases involving
the Environmental Protection Agency, obscenity, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
racial segregation, cases involving the Federal Communications Commission, the Contracts
Clause, and First Amendment challenges to commercial speech. See SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 21-40, 54-57.
100 Using the same methodology as that for creating the courts of appeals database, I
created a comprehensive data set of every Supreme Court preemption decision handed
down between October 1991 and June 2009. The data set is available for download as an
Excel file at http://claranet.scu.edu/eres/coursepage.aspx?cid=293 1 &page=docs#.
10 If we count all decisions in which the Court was unanimous as to the result from
October Term 1991 through October Term 2008, then the Court's rate of unanimity in all
cases decided with signed opinions after oral argument was 41.93% (639 out of 1,524). If
instead we only count those decisions in which the Court was unanimous both as to the
result and the opinion, then the justices were unanimous in 32.68% (498 out of 1,524) of its
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preemption decisions in the courts of appeals, owing to the nature of Supreme
Court's merits docket; again, the Court typically hears only the most difficult
cases, ones raising questions on which the lower courts have disagreed. But the
spread between the Court's rate of unanimity in preemption cases and that for its
merits docket as whole suggests that preemption has provoked a below-average
level of division among the justices.
At the same time, in those preemption cases where at least one justice
dissented, Republican appointees favored preemption more frequently than
Democratic appointees, and by a significant margin. Justices appointed by
Republican presidents (Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts, and Associate
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and
Alito) voted in favor of preemption at a rate of 51.0% in non-unanimous cases,
while justices appointed by Democratic presidents (Associate Justices White,
Breyer, and Ginsburg) did so at a rate of only 32.5%. Moreover, if we categorize
the justices based on their widely acknowledged ideological leanings-that is, if
we describe Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter as liberals, despite their party
affiliations at the time of their appointments-the fissure is even more substantial.
The Court's more conservative justices voted in favor of preemption in non-
unanimous cases at a rate of 59.0%, while the more liberal justices voted for
preemption at a rate of only 32.9%. Both of these differences-that between
Republican and Democratic appointees, and that between more conservative and
more liberal justices-are statistically significant at a 99% level of confidence. 10 2
Thus, preemption cases at the Supreme Court have played out in much the
same way as they have in the courts of appeals. In general, preemption has been a
source of less friction than the average issue on the Court's docket. But when the
justices have disagreed, Republicans (and conservatives) have favored preemption
more frequently than Democrats (and liberals). Again, this may be unsurprising.
As I have detailed elsewhere, though the modem Republican Party has pushed for
both a reduction in government regulation over private enterprise and for
increasing state governmental autonomy, it has typically prioritized the more
cases decided with signed opinions after oral argument over this time frame. See The
Statistics, 123 HARV. L. REV. 382, 387 (2009); The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 521
(2008); The Statistics, 121 HARV. L. REV. 436, 441 (2007); The Statistics, 120 HARv. L.
REV. 372, 377 (2006); The Statistics, 119 HARv. L. REV. 415, 423 (2005); The Statistics,
118 HARv. L. REV. 497, 502 (2004); The Statistics, 117 HARv. L. REV. 480, 484 (2003);
The Statistics, 116 HARv. L. REV. 453, 457 (2002); The Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REV. 539,
543 (2001); The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REV. 390, 394 (2000); The Statistics, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 400, 404 (1999); The Statistics, 112 HARv. L. REV. 366, 370 (1998); The Statistics,
111 HARv. L. REV. 431, 433 (1997); The Statistics, 110 HARv. L. REV. 367, 369 (1996);
The Statistics, 109 HARv. L. REV. 340, 342 (1995); The Statistics, 108 HARv. L. REV. 372,
374 (1994); The Statistics, 107 HARV. L. REV. 372, 374 (1993); The Statistics, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 378, 380 (1992).
102 The Z-value for the difference between Republican and Democratic appointees is
2.598. The Z-value for the difference between conservative and liberal justices is 4.5.
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immediate goal of deregulation over the more abstract principle of federalism.103
And this ordering of preferences within the party as a whole appears to be reflected
in the behavior of federal appellate judges appointed by Republican presidents, at
least at the margin.
B. Diferences across the Courts of Appeals
Another pattern worth noting concerns the differences in voting patterns
across the different courts of appeals. For instance, judges on the D.C. Circuit and
the Eighth Circuit were quite friendly to claims of preemption, voting in favor of
preemption at rates of 83% and 69%, respectively. In contrast, judges on the Sixth
Circuit (49%) and the Ninth Circuit (50%) were relatively hostile to preemption.
Even more interestingly, Democrats on some courts of appeals voted in favor of
preemption more frequently than most court-specific groups of Republicans, and
Republicans on some courts of appeals voted against preemption more frequently
than most court-level groups of Democrats. Democrats on the Tenth Circuit, for
example, voted in favor of preemption more frequently than Republicans on any
court other than those on the D.C. and Federal Circuits, both of which handed
down only a handful of preemption decisions. Thus, among courts that decided at
least ten preemption cases between 2005 and 2009, the group of judges singularly
most apt to vote in favor of preemption was Democrats on the Tenth Circuit.
Meanwhile, Republicans on the First Circuit were less likely to vote in favor of
preemption (42%) than any other discrete group of judges on any court of appeals.
Because the number of cases decided by any one circuit was rather small
(between 8 and 133), many of these disparities may just be noise in the data.
Nonetheless, the results suggest an intriguing possibility: that the court on which a
judge sits may be a critical variable in predicting her voting record in preemption
decisions-and perhaps a more significant variable than the national political party
with which she is affiliated. For instance, that a judge sits on the Ninth Circuit may
tell us more about how likely she is to favor preemption than that she was
appointed by a Republican president. A rigorous examination of this possibility is
beyond the scope of this Article, but it seems a promising avenue for further
research, both for preemption cases specifically and for circuit court decision
making more generally.
C. Possible Panel Effects
Finally, the data (at least at first blush) seem to reveal some ideological "panel
effects" in voting patterns-more specifically, panel effects among Democratic
appointees. As table 7 illustrates, the rate at which Democrats voted in favor of
103 See Joondeph, supra note 36, at 157-67. This article demonstrates that when it has
mattered most, the modem Republican Party has generally cared more about reducing
government regulation than it has about state autonomy. This is reflected in party
platforms, campaign themes, and votes in Congress. Id.
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preemption declined as the panel composition became more Democratic: 60.8%
when serving on one-Democrat panels, 56.7% when serving on two-Democrat
panels, and 48.9% when serving on all-Democrat panels. More generally,
Democratic judges voted in favor of preemption at a rate of 55.5% when serving
on panels with at least one Republican appointee (compared to a rate of only
48.9% for all-Democrat panels)."" These figures suggest that Democratic
appointees may have behaved differently when surrounded by like-minded
colleagues. That is, the absence of a potential dissenting voice may have led
Democratic judges to indulge their political preferences more freely and
frequently. Such a pattern would be consistent with other recent studies of judicial
voting records on the courts of appeals, several of which have found ideological
panel effects across a variety of issues.105 Moreover, the idea that judges might
behave differently when surrounded exclusively by like-minded colleagues-that
ideological diversity (or the existence of a potential whistle-blower) might produce
more compromise, while ideological homogeneity might lead to group
polarization-is well-grounded in a large body of research. 0 6
A more careful parsing of the data, however, reveals that these apparent panel
effects in preemption decisions are probably illusory. First, given the small number
of all-Democrat panel decisions (forty-four in total), the difference in voting rates
for Democrats on nixed-party panels and all-Democrat panels referenced above
(55.5% versus 48.9%) is not statistically significant, even at a lenient 90% level of
confidence. 0 7 Second, and more importantly, a grossly disproportionate number of
the all-Democrat panel decisions (thirty-one of the forty-four) were handed down
by the Ninth Circuit. This is simply because the Ninth Circuit is so much larger
than the other circuits (with twenty-nine active judgeships 08 ), thus producing a
104 The rate for Democrats voting for preemption on all mixed-party panels (55.5%) is
below that for Democrats on one-Democrat panels (61%) and on two-Democrat panels
(57%) because it also includes decisions from two-judge and en banc panels. In the three en
banc decisions included in the study, Democrats voted against preemption by a combined
margin of 22 to 0.
105 See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 53, at 38; SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 24-57
(finding statistically significant panel effects in the voting records of circuit court judges in
sixteen of the twenty-four issue areas examined); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles,
Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 53 (2008); Cross & Tiller, supra
note 54, at 2169; Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of
Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1319, 1322-24
(2009); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 870 (2006); Richard L.
Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of
Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1100, 1100-01
(2001); Revesz, supra note 54, at 1717-18.
106 For a general discussion of the phenomenon as it applies to appellate judges, see
Cass R. Stunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal
Courts ofAppeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REv. 301, 337-47 (2004).
107 The Z-value for this difference is 1.374.
108 28 U.S.C..§ 44(a) (2006).
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much higher number of one-party panels. And as described earlier, the Ninth
Circuit was significantly more likely than the average circuit court to reject
preemption claims. The confluence of these two facts-that most all-Democrat
decisions were from the Ninth Circuit, and that the Ninth Circuit was generally
averse to preemption-depressed the voting rate in favor of preemption for all-
Democrat panels, pushing it well below the average for Democrats overall. But this
is not because judges behaved differently depending on the panel composition.
Indeed, if we isolate the Ninth Circuit's decisions and divide them by panel
composition, we see that Democratic appointees were more likely to vote in favor
of preemption when they served on all-Democrat panels than when they served on
mixed-party panels (51.7% versus 46.1%). In other words, what looks like a panel
effect when examining the full data set is really a "Ninth Circuit effect"-a
coincidental byproduct of the Ninth Circuit being both large and comparatively
hostile to preemption.
Of course, these data cannot establish that partisan panel effects do not exist
in preemption decisions; a more comprehensive study, evaluating more variables
over a longer time frame, might uncover such an influence. Rather, my point is that
the findings presented here do not support such a hypothesis, despite the initial
appearances. What seems like a shift in behavior by Democratic appointees is
actually the result of factors unrelated to the panel's partisan composition.
V. CONCLUSION
Again, the study presented here yields two core findings. First, although many
issues seem to have become ideological battlegrounds in the circuit courts, federal
preemption is not one of them. One could certainly imagine a different state of
affairs. Given the significance of preemption, both in terms of constitutional
principles and practical consequences, it would be understandable if preemption
were a source of substantial friction between Republicans and Democrats. But it is
not. The accepted sources of legal authority, or perhaps the norms of consensus
and collegiality on the courts of appeals, have largely controlled judges' decisions.
Second, to the extent the issue of preemption does carry a partisan valence,
that valence is one in which Republican judges tend to vote in favor of preemption
and Democratic judges tend to vote against it. This might be because, within the
Republican Party, those who care deeply about reducing economic regulation have
been more successful than conservatives of other stripes in shaping their party's
judicial nominations. Or it might be because those within the Democratic Party
who are committed to preserving state-level regulation of private business activity
(particularly through tort liability) have been successful in shaping their party's
judicial nominations. Or it might be a combination of these two factors-or some
other phenomenon altogether. Regardless, in the few preemption cases where at
least one judge dissented, Republican circuit judges were much more apt to vote in
favor of preemption than Democrats.
These basic findings may confirm what many already suspected. But in doing
so, they tell us something useful. By shedding light on the partisan dimensions to
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preemption disputes within the federal courts, these findings enhance our
understanding of how constitutional federalism actually functions in practice in the
United States. More broadly, these findings provide one more reference point in
our ongoing assessment of the various ways in which political forces shape-or
fail to shape-the behavior of judges.
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